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RESPONSE
VAN DE VEN AND JOHNSON’S “ENGAGED
SCHOLARSHIP”: NICE TRY, BUT. . .
BILL MCKELVEY
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Practitioners find little value in academic research. Some see it as a knowledge flow
problem; others see practitioner and academic knowledge as unrelated. Van de Ven
and Johnson propose a pluralistic collective of researchers and practitioners using
“engaged scholarship” and intellectual arbitrage to create practitioner-meaningful
research. It’s a nice dream, but not a solution; bias, disciplines, and particularism
remain. Neither discipline-centric nor practitioner-driven research offers a solution.
Earthquake science offers a better model for business school research.
Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) draw on Simon
(1967) to state the obvious: a key mission of busi-
ness schools is to produce research that ad-
vances practice. They also cite observers who
argue that this mission, by and large, has failed
(Anderson, Herriot, & Hodgkinson, 2001; Beer,
2001; Beyer & Trice, 1982; Brief & Dukerich, 1991;
Gibbons et al., 1994; Hodgkinson, Herriot, &
Anderson, 2001; Lawler, Mohrman, Mohrman,
Ledford, & Cummings, 1985; Rynes, Bartunek, &
Daft, 2001; Van de Ven, 2002; Weick, 2001). Pfeffer
and Fong (2002), Bennis and O’Toole (2005), and
Ghoshal (2005) are recent additions. Most of the
dates are post 2000. If anything, business schools
apparently are getting worse. I’ll term this the
knowledge failure problem. Before turning to the
proposed fixes, I’ll take a quick look at the knowl-
edge “food chain.” Next, I’ll offer comments on
problems I have with the Van de Ven and Johnson
solution. I’ll then provide a suggestion of my own.
Whatever one thinks about the various solutions
discussed, there is no question that the knowledge
failure problem is the dominant issue as business
schools start the twenty-first century. Carnegie
Commission, where are you?
I figure Andy and Paul are tough guys, so it
won’t be the end of their world if I sharpen the
dialectic. In any event, their scholarship is im-
pressive; I have learned much from reading
their article.
THE KNOWLEDGE FOOD CHAIN
Van de Ven and Johnson see the positioning of
management research as equivalent to the po-
sitioning of engineering relative to the physical
sciences and medicine relative to the biological
sciences (2006: 808). Knowledge production and
consumption are not unlike the biological food
chain. At the left end we have, say, mosquitoes;
at the right end we have T. rexes. Reading from
the left, we see the production of ever-larger and
more complex creatures; reading from the right,
we see the consumption of ever-smaller kinds of
animals/plants. As Van de Ven and Johnson de-
scribe the knowledge food chain, “Knowledge is
created and tested by academic researchers,
taught to students by instructors, adopted and
diffused by consultants, and practiced by prac-
titioners” (2006: 805). In earthquake country, the
engineering food chain looks like this:
Physics, Earthquake Science, Engineering,
City Building Code Departments, Builders,
Buyers
Medicine looks like this:
Biology, Medical Research, Medical Schools,
Ph.D.s/M.D.s, 4th- to 1st-Level Hospitals, GPs,
Patients
I would describe the business school food
chain as follows:
Disciplines, Management Research, Ph.D./
M.B.A. Students, Consultants, Practitioners
Food chains can be read from either direction.
Thus, in life science, the discovery of DNA even-
tually leads to new molecules in drugs that cure
patients. The increasing prevalence of Alzhei-
mer’s disease in patients leads to stem cell re-
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search. Arguably, on the one hand, business
school research is increasingly held hostage to
the epistemology of basic disciplines—a prob-
lem. On the other hand, we have the following
quote:
The only way we can make our field more useful
is to start doing—and rewarding—work that can
be read and applied by business people (Daven-
port, quoted in Lytras, 2005).
Should management research be held hos-
tage to people who seem mentally challenged
when reading the Harvard Business Review?
This is one danger in Van de Ven and Johnson’s
approach.
REVIEW OF THE VAN DE VEN AND JOHNSON
ARGUMENT
Van de Ven and Johnson review two existing
solutions to the knowledge failure problem and
then detail their own. I review these briefly so as
to highlight the differences.
The Knowledge Transfer Problem
The first school of thought the authors review
holds that knowledge failure is a knowledge
transfer problem. I list key elements of their
argument below. Needless to say, in this view
knowledge flow is left to right and it stops just
before it gets to M.B.A.s and consultants.
The Knowledge Transfer Problem:
1. Academic research isn’t put into a form that
can be applied in practice.
2. Little attention is paid to the transfer prob-
lem.
3. Researchers don’t take responsibility for
knowledge transfer.
4. Authoritarian and coercive styles of impart-
ing knowledge, defensiveness by teachers
and researchers, and self-interested recom-
mendations by consultants inhibit the flow.
5. Academic research interpretation fails be-
cause researchers don’t collaborate with
practitioners.
6. We know little about what makes research
useful.
7. We don’t appreciate just how much knowl-
edge changes as it goes through the trans-
fer process.
8. We don’t understand (Aristotle’s) art of per-
suasion.
9. Researchers don’t take time to appreciate or
understand the context of the practitioner.
Theory and Practice As Distinct Kinds
A second school the authors review holds that
academics and practitioners live in two differ-
ent knowledge worlds. Expecting knowledge to
flow left to right is like expecting round pegs to
fit square holes—no wonder we have a knowl-
edge failure problem. Since we already know
very well how academics do research and pro-
duce knowledge, this school starts at the right-
hand end. How do practitioners, and how should
academics, learn about practitioner problems?
Beginning with Kondrat’s (1992) work, I show key
elements of their view here.
Theory and Practice As Distinct Kinds:
1. What knowledge does a practitioner actu-
ally use and how does he or she obtain it?
How does he or she construct an action?
2. What do competent practitioners know and
what do they know about knowing?
3. The “knowledge transfer” school privi-
leges academic knowledge and devalues
practitioner-created knowledge.
4. Practitioner knowledge is a distinct form of
knowing in its own right.
5. In Aristotelian terms, phronesis (practical
knowledge) is just as important as epis-
teme (basic knowledge) and techne (ap-
plied technical knowledge).
6. Practical knowledge is tacit and embodied
in action; only immersion in the job pro-
duces relevant techne—even scientists
rely on task-immersed knowledge con-
struction.
7. Scientists study generalizable problems
that are, as much as possible, context free;
practitioners use knowledge that is site
specific and date stamped—it is custom-
ized, derived from experience, and aimed
at specific situations.
8. Practical knowledge is a distinct form of
knowledge having epistemological status
equal to that of academic knowledge.
9. The epistemological rules of good scien-
tific knowledge are fundamentally differ-
ent from what is necessary for valid prac-
tical knowledge; practice-aimed inquiry
cannot stand outside practice, as scientific
epistemology dictates.
10. Practitioner-relevant knowledge can also
be produced with detachment; it can
achieve “objectivity” by relying on multi-
ple observers to rise above idiosyncratic
viewpoints.
11. Practitioners construct new theories for
new contexts.
12. Valid practitioner knowledge has to be ac-
tionable.
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This school takes a no-flow-needed stance.
Each kind of knowledge exists, but this school
writes off the left end as unfathomable, al-
though not necessarily irrelevant. Left unan-
swered is the following: If practitioner knowl-
edge is independent, validly produced, and
useful to practitioners, why should business
schools bother with academic knowledge?
Should they do it just to look good to promotion
committees at universities or to keep journal
editors happy? Should they do it even though it
appears to have little, if any, practical rele-
vance? Now one can see why the debate is heat-
ing up (Grey, 2001; Huff, 2000; Kilduff & Kelemen,
2001; Weick, 2001). Interestingly, Van de Ven and
Johnson report that citation rates and practical
relevance are somewhat correlated (Baldridge,
Floyd, & Markoczy, 2004), as citations are with
researcher familiarity with research sites
(Rynes, McNatt, & Bretz, 1999).
Van de Ven and Johnson’s Solution:
Knowledge Production via Engaged
Scholarship
Van de Ven and Johnson try to bridge the
“distinct kinds” gap by what Boyer (1990) and
Pettigrew (2001) call “engaged scholarship.” I
list the essentials of their logic below, mention-
ing key aspects such as intellectual arbitrage,
conflict management, and dialectical form.
While I summarize a fair amount of the Van de
Ven and Johnson story line, readers need to read
their article to fully appreciate the depth and
nuanced contextual richness of their well-
argued discourse.
The Van de Ven and Johnson Solution: Knowl-
edge Production via Engaged Scholarship:
1. Engaged scholarship is a “set of reforms to
break down the insular behaviors of aca-
demic departments and disciplines” (2006:
809):
a. Calls for a fundamental shift from dis-
connected, distanced researchers to re-
searcher collectives involving both busi-
ness school scientists and practitioners.
b. Calls for this collective to jointly produce
research meeting academic standards
and practitioner needs.
c. Shifts organizations from data collection
sites to idea factories where “practition-
ers and scholars coproduce knowledge”
(2006: 809).
2. A key aspect of the research collective’s be-
havior is “intellectual arbitrage” (2006: 809):
a. Idea is to take advantage of differing ac-
ademic and practitioner perspectives so
as to design better research—multiple
discipline/academic and different func-
tional practice perspectives.
b. Advocates a “dialectical method of in-
quiry,” rather than research from oppo-
site ends of the food chain, and a con-
frontation of “divergent theses and
antitheses.”
c. Eschews narrow technical research strat-
egies in favor of triangulating in on prob-
lems from different perspectives.
d. Advocates Azevedo’s (2002) “pluralistic
methodology.”
3. Needless to say, conflict resolution becomes
a key issue in intellectual arbitrage:
a. Given the research collective’s pluralis-
tic views, conflict is inevitable; conflict
and power relations take center place.
b. Creative conflict management becomes
the central challenge; suppressing con-
flict defeats the purpose of the pluralistic
collective.
c. Task conflict is encouraged; personal
conflict is to be avoided.
4. The “dialectical form of engaged scholar-
ship” consists of five “dimensions” (2006:
809–815), which occupies a third of their ar-
ticle. Engaged scholarship needs the fol-
lowing:
a. A focus on big questions grounded in re-
ality—that is, large, complex problems
offering no immediate payoffs to aca-
demics or practitioners; both ends of the
food chain have to be motivated; schol-
ars from different disciplines and practi-
tioners from different functions need to
be involved.
b. A collaborative learning community; the
pluralistic collective needs to meet regu-
larly and members need to come to know
and respect each other, practice con-
cilience, find ways to rise above conven-
tional scientific requirements, propri-
etary concerns, or pragmatic pressures,
and have rules of engagement.
c. An extended time over which to build
relationships, to find ways to make sig-
nificant advances, to get academics
closer to the practitioners’ phenomena, to
get practitioners in touch with academic
concerns, and to conduct longitudinal re-
search.
d. Multiple models and methods, scientific
pluralism, triangulation of methods,
propositions that “carve at the joints,”
and methods of testing alternative plau-
sible hypotheses.
e. A reexamination of researcher assump-
tions and researcher self-reflection; re-
searchers should warm up to the inter-
ventionist model of action research, use
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arbitrage to work out conflicts stemming
from traditional “detachment” versus
“action research” values, and intertwine
clinical and researcher roles to pool in-
sights.
PROBLEMS WITH THE VAN DE VEN AND
JOHNSON SOLUTION
Most charitably, one can see that Van de Ven
and Johnson attempt to resolve both the “knowl-
edge transfer” and “distinct kinds” problems.
Arguments aside, their program shows some re-
semblance to Chris Argyris’s well-known “ac-
tion research” perspective (1970, 1980; Argyris,
Putnam, & McLain Smith, 1985; Argyris & Scho¨n,
1974, 1978, 1996] and Ed Schein’s (1987) work.
Argyris might say, “Been there, done that.” In
fact, what is new is Van de Ven and Johnson’s
idea of the pluralistic collective of academics
and practitioners collaborating on difficult is-
sues over an extended time period; they add
arbitrage, big questions, and method triangula-
tion. This is surely different from the isolated
Argyris, Scho¨n, Schein, and many others con-
sulting/researching with some firm. One might
wonder how anyone can be even a little nega-
tive about the “goods” in italics.
In principle, a lot of things should happen that
in reality don’t: CEOs not cheating on share-
holders; husbands not cheating on wives or
wives on husbands; students working to get the
best out of a class rather than cheating on the
exam; consulting firms actually accomplishing
something positive for their clients rather than
selling useless best practices for high fees; build-
ings that survive the next big quake; politicians
that don’t lie, cheat, and steal; Presidents that
don’t pay off big business and friends at the ex-
pense of virtually everything else; and on and on.
In dreamland, engaged scholarship, intellec-
tual arbitrage, conflict resolution, and Van de
Ven and Johnson’s five dimensions could work.
In reality. . . I am not so sure. The joint probabil-
ity that all their required elements would line up
simultaneously at the right time and place
seems low. Worse, there could be outright deal
breakers. A number of possible downsides come
to mind.
Bias
Firms have particularistic, specific, time-
dated interests and proprietary concerns. Is this
a good platform for scientific truth claims? Ac-
tion researchers and academic consultants al-
ways have a conflict of interest—keeping the
client happy and getting consulting fees versus
doing what would be best for science. Engaged
scholarship consists of pluralistic interests and
conflict; there is the risk of decision by commit-
tee, power contests, and settling for the lowest
common denominator. Assuming the less like-
ly—that the parties remain (statistically) inde-
pendent—there is the risk that the “average”
across many of these projects would be decision
by committee. More likely, given the obvious
interdependence, the behavior of the collective
could spiral into very constructive or very dys-
functional outcomes via positive feedback cy-
cles, but outside (disconnected) scientists
wouldn’t necessarily know which to accept as
truth claims. Besides, has any significant, novel,
science-type “truth” actually emerged from the
decades of action research?
Personally, I think consulting addles the sci-
entific mind. Judging from the business media
books, most managers are seemingly incapable
of aspiring even to the “intellectual” level of the
Harvard Business Review. They are phobic
against the word “academic.” I remain uncon-
vinced that science is well served by constant
dumbing down to four-cell tables. I don’t see any
evidence that academics who thrive on “inter-
preting” to practitioners are ever at the forefront
of scientific novelty. All the Nobel laureates do
their creating first and then write their “pop”
books. It seems unlikely that business school
profs could do the opposite. I don’t see that ac-
tion research has ever risen above the simple
wish some professors have of trying to get rich
doing research.
Finally, there is the famous phrase “What is
good for GM is good for the country.” Is it
equally true that what is good for GM is good for
science? Even business school science?
Food Chain Problems
Suppose we accept that there is a gap in the
knowledge food chain. Bridging the gap via en-
gaged scholarship accepts that both ends of the
chain remain unchanged. One could argue that
Van de Ven and Johnson are bridging the inef-
fective. Consider that knowledge flows each di-
rection. Parsons’ (1951) universalism/particular-
ism dimension is a key aspect.
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Going left to right—the discipline effect. Dis-
ciplines create the wrong basis for management
research; they focus on would-be universalist
but discipline-specific theories and terms, disci-
pline-centric methods, and the like. Discipline
perspectives are seemingly not useful to practi-
tioners, nor are discipline-based truth claims.
Academics writing papers for disciplines have
different success criteria than practitioners. The
foregoing statements reflect much of what is
implied by both knowledge failure schools, so I
won’t expand further here.
Much of business school prestige is now de-
fined in terms of achieving close ties with un-
derlying disciplines. Top-ranked business
schools generally hire discipline-centric Ph.Ds.
In Starbuck’s (2005) just-out essay on publication
quality in A journals, the Administrative Science
Quarterly is the only “business school” journal
included in his analysis. But is it really a busi-
ness school journal any more? For some of my
sociologist colleagues, the Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly is now seen as the “third” place
to publish organizational sociology papers, after
the American Sociological Review and the
American Journal of Sociology. The institutional
structure imposing on business schools exerts
an irresistible pull toward discipline-centric re-
search.
Going right to left—the firm effect. Practition-
ers need immediate help; they can’t wait for
scientists’ lengthy conception-to-publication
time cycle. They need site- and time-specific
insights. Tomorrow is what counts. They are not
especially helped by longitudinal studies based
on questions and data defined one or more de-
cades ago. There are three additional “nega-
tives” in going from competitively advanta-
geous site-specific findings to findings
independent of time and place and then back
again to application in a specific firm at a spe-
cific time.
1. While Southwest Airlines may have “mod-
erate complexity” that makes it inimitable
(Porter, 1996; Rivkin, 2001), most firms, hav-
ing found some kind of distinctive competi-
tive advantage via good research, would be
stupid to share it with other firms.
2. In addition, if we were to actually accumu-
late particularistic research—via engaged
scholarship—from a collection of individual
firms into some kind of “average,” we would
still have the same problem we already
have, which is going from the average to the
dated context of a specific firm.
3. Any truth claim based on site-specific re-
search having value to a specific firm could
have little value to another—Toyota is GM’s
competitor; Toyota is not Toyota’s competi-
tor. They live in different niches.
It is arguably illogical to have “science” go
from right to left in the knowledge food chain. To
sum up my concerns, at the worst, engaged
scholarship could produce the following:
Conflict of Interest  Conflict  Decision by
Committee  Particularism  Bad Science
Campbellian Realism
For epistemological justification, Van de Ven
and Johnson cite Jane Azevedo (1997, 2002), who,
in turn, cites Campbell (1974), Hooker (1987),
Hahlweg and Hooker (1989), Campbell and
Paller (1989), and my “Campbellian realism”
(1999, 2002). Collectively, these scholars develop
the evolutionary naturalist realist epistemology.
Whereas scientific realism stems from natural
science and Campbell’s realism embraces the
notion of objective reality as the criterion vari-
able, Campbell also accepted scientists’ idio-
syncratic interpretations of that reality, as well
as the follow-on social construction by a scien-
tific community. The latter gave rise to Kuhn’s
(1962) paradigms.
The quote from Azevedo (2002: 730), which Van
de Ven and Johnson use on page 809, was writ-
ten within the context of her concern about par-
adigmatic narrowness. Thus, her advocacy of
pluralism is to get out from under the con-
straints of a single paradigm. Her book is titled
Mapping Reality because she wants us to think
of theories as maps. A map is a simplified, ide-
alized view of some part of our world, usually
created for a specific purpose like locating
roads and towns; rivers, mountains, and plains;
or earthquake fault zones and state boundaries.
Sometimes a theory or map can be used for a
purpose other than its initial specific intention.
In their engaged scholarship, Van de Ven and
Johnson claim that different paradigm perspec-
tives, like different maps, offer usefully different
views of the same territory or firm. So far, all
okay for the authors.
In the knowledge food chain, discipline para-
digms are at the left end. Van de Ven and John-
son’s starting problem is not that there is a
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dearth of paradigm perspectives; it is that any
one of them comes to a halt before it offers
useful information to practitioners. Adding mul-
tiple paradigm perspectives—that is, plural-
ism—appears to me to simply complicate the
practitioner problem, not help it. I don’t see
much reason to think that more paradigms help
the knowledge flow problem. It seems as though
they could make it worse.
While I think Campbellian realism offers
sound legitimacy on which to base organization
science, if anything, it makes the flow problem
worse by reinforcing the scientific legitimacy of
the several castle-like, strong-paradigm disci-
plines at the left end. There is nothing in the
current rules of scientific realism that allows
paradigms to accept site- and time-specific find-
ings as broad “scientific” truth claims. Improve-
ments to action research of any kind, virtually
by definition, can’t overcome this. Another way
needs to be found.
REDEFINING THE FOOD CHAIN
It is hard to imagine mosquitoes and T. rexes
collaborating on anything, although tickbirds
and hippos have a symbiotic relationship. I
have never heard of builders collaborating with
engineers to design earthquake-safe buildings
(although architects obviously do). Practicing
physicians, however, often become clinical pro-
fessors with research grants at medical schools.
Thus, in some chains the ends are symbiotic; in
others they are not. Why symbiosis in one and
not the other? Why physicians doing science
and not consultants? M.D.s are different from
M.B.A.s?
Mostly, I think the answer lies in the nature of
the phenomena. In people, biomolecules are
mostly the same from one end of the chain to the
other; hearts, lungs, brains, and bones are
mostly the same from one end to the other; and
quantitative research based on sampling from
populations works the same from one end to the
other—scientific findings reduced to averages
work pretty well. Not perfectly, needless to say.
Just listen to the drug ads on TV every night—all
those horrible side effects. While most bodies
are helped by a particular drug “solution,” some
clearly are not. Still, averages work quite well
for most patients.
With organizations and management I don’t
think this is the case. What gets stamped as
legitimate research at the left end is discipline-
centric quantitative research with large sam-
ples, Gaussian statistics, findings reduced to
averages, and confidence intervals for statisti-
cal significance based on finite variance. Prac-
titioners live in a world of extremes—Toyota,
eBay, Google, Southwest, Wal-Mart, and GE are
good; Alitalia, Enron, Anderson, WorldCom, Lu-
cent, and the FBI are bad. All of the cases used
in M.B.A. classrooms are stories about good and
bad examples—extremes, never averages. If one
scans “business media” books, such as In
Search of Excellence (Peters & Waterman, 1982),
Built to Last (Collins & Porras, 1994), Hidden
Value (O’Reilly & Pfeffer, 2000), and Good to
Great (Collins, 2001), one sees that they are
mostly about good and bad examples, never
about “averages.” If one thinks of organization
and management phenomena as appearing in
all sorts of weird shapes, what happens in dis-
cipline research is that all these weird shapes
are crammed into the square hole of Gaussian
statistics. It’s called “robustness.” “Extreme” sci-
ence is spelled out in Andriani and McKelvey
(2005).
For example, leadership research keeps pro-
ducing findings about averages. Practitioners
don’t give a damn about averages. They want to
know how to identify good and bad leaders. The
cost of a bad leader at the top is horrendous.
Board members and CEOs don’t care about av-
erage firms; they want firms that generate
above-average profits—in any industry only the
top few firms generate most of the economic
rents. There is nothing in an “average” that tells
a company how to have a competitive advan-
tage. Nothing. Yet that is the “knowledge” they
get from all the academics at the left end of the
strategy food chain. How can studies about av-
erages point to idiosyncratic advantage? It’s il-
logical. All the economists’ math in the world
can’t fix this.
CONCLUSION
I think the food chain is not so much broken;
it’s that the wrong stuff is flowing—or would
flow, if we all took Van de Ven and Johnson
seriously. Practitioners keep looking for T-bone
steaks, but what keeps flowing are turkeys. I
don’t quite see how any amount of engaged
scholarship, paradigm pluralism, arbitrage,
conflict resolution, big questions, and so forth is
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going to turn turkeys into T-bones, even if the
flow from the left is renewed. Starting from the
right end produces bad science, and, besides,
why should firms let the good stuff out? This
goes counter to their competing for idiosyncratic
advantage. Not that it isn’t common knowledge
what the problem is, but why would Dell go out
of its way to give the good stuff to HP? I hate to
say it, Andy and Paul; your dream sounds great,
but your path is full of potholes, and, besides, it
leads in the wrong direction.
To repeat, the problem is that what has
plugged up the food chain are findings about
averages. Management researchers need to
learn from earthquake science. It is the only
legitimate science studying extremes. Califor-
nia has 16,000 “average” quakes per year. No
one cares. We design buildings for the “big one”
that will come some day. Managers don’t worry
about averages; they live in a world of extremes,
and they want more of the good ones and won-
der how to better avoid the bad ones.
Yes, I agree, there are phenomena here and
there in firms and industries and societies that
fit the Gaussian world. Our bodies live in the
world of Newtonian dynamics, but relativity the-
ory is “out there.” The managerial world is not
so simple; practitioners face both independent
and interdependent data points (phenomena) in
firms and industries. They don’t know when
their world shifts from Gaussian distributions to
extreme events, power laws, and Paretian dis-
tributions. They just know that it does and that
what they get from academia is invariably from
an assumed Gaussian world (McKelvey & Andri-
ani, 2005).
So, Andy and Paul, I say Thanksgiving for
practitioners is not about getting turkeys to flow
better from the left. Nor does it come from start-
ing from the right; even T. rexes can’t create their
own food—no flow, no food. It’s about reinstitu-
tionalizing business school research toward a
science of extremes rather than averages. A rig-
orous beginning in this direction is taken by
Baum and McKelvey (2006). Martin, are you lis-
tening?
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